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Abstract 
The relationship between communication and action and agency is discussed. Crucial 
themes pertaining to action are presented in their intersection with communication. The 
question of intentionality is contrasted with the pragmatic view of communication. The role 
communication plays in providing alternate descriptions of action is also discussed, as well 
as the importance of communication in the individuation of action, i.e. in bringing together 
the many elements that constitute a single action. The entry then discusses the shared 
character of action, as well as the action of collectives, including organizations, for which 
conventional models of action struggle to account. The conventional opposition between 
“real” action and less than real communication is also discussed. 
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ACTION AND AGENCY 
Writing on the notions of action and agency necessarily brings to mind a plethora of 
neighboring concepts, including praxis, practice, activity or event. Attempting to cover all of 
them would make this entry a general course in the history of philosophy and sociology, 
which, obviously, it is not. It could be argued that the whole of social sciences is concerned 
with action. For example, praxis would bring us back to the origins of Western philosophy 
and to Aristotle’s distinction between theoria (contemplation of truth), poiesis (the 
worker’s production) and praxis, which was reserved to the free man. Like Karl Marx, 
American philosopher Hannah Arendt understands praxis as the translation of philosophy 
into action. The notion of practice, for its part, would require revisiting French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu work on the notion, but also that of many of his disciples, including Luc 
Boltanski or organization theorist Michel Crozier, in addition to examining the whole 
“practice turn” in contemporary social sciences, as discussed for instance by influential 
researchers including Martha Feldman, Wanda Olikowski or Dalvir Samra-Fredericks. The 
concept of activity as deep roots in developmental psychology, in particular in the works of 
Russian psychologist Alexei Leontiev, today, the writings of Finnish scholar Yrjö Engeström. 
The concept of event, for its part, would require a commentary on the works of 
philosophers Michel Foucault (with the idea of “eventualization”), Gilles Deleuze or Jacques 
Derrida. The limited space that is available here, but also clarity of argument, require that 
this discussion be kept at a relatively general level, where different meanings of the notion 
of “action” are used more or less interchangeably. 
Furthermore, the notion of action, while usually understood as referring to human 
action, is also used to discuss collective action – which has addressed prominently by Nobel 
prize winner Elinor Ostrom –, organizational action (see King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010), or 
the action of material entities, which in the field of communication is being studied, for 
example, by François Cooren, Boris Brummans and other colleagues at the Université de 
Montréal, in Canada. 
INTENTIONALITY AND TRUE ACTION 
That being said, when the term “action” is used in conjunction with “agency,” it is 
usually in a specific usage, that of philosophy of action, which focus on the deeds of human 
within social contexts. Philosophical texts offering to explore the theme of action and agency 
are not scarce. Many of them are concerned with the discovery of criteria to define “true” 
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action as opposed, for example, to involuntary bodily behaviors or to unintended 
consequences. The debate concerns, for instance, the distinction between “the things that 
merely happen to people – the events they undergo – and the various things they genuinely 
do” (Wilson & Shpall, 2012, not paginated). One criterion for genuine action would consist 
in intentionality. For instance, British philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe suggests that the agent 
must be aware of her own action, without this awareness being an external self-
observation, and she must experience her action as something she controls (as reported in 
Grünbaum, 2010). American philosopher of language John Searle also considers 
intentionality as crucial to action and, in particular, to meaning, as understanding consists 
in a reconstruction of the intention (a similar argument is made by his fellow philosopher 
Paul Grice). Whether intention is central to action and its meaning – and whether there is 
any need for a distinction between “real” action and other forms of events – is in part 
challenged when the focus is moved away from the originator of action to its receivers or 
observers. Many European philosophers, including Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, 
Umberto Eco, and Jacques Derrida, among others, argued for a focus on the reception of 
action, rather than on its initiation and intention – for, after all, the author may very well be 
“dead.” 
The view of action as being tied to intentionality restricts the notion of action to 
human beings. It limits the ability to account for, say, organizational action or that of other 
collectives, unless it is supposed that these may have a form of consciousness and self-
awareness. Furthermore, perhaps because of the legacy of structural linguistics, which 
distinguishes between language as a system of meanings (langue) and language as a 
situated performance (parole), action is seen as distinct from other elements that would 
constitute its context or the structure where it takes place (Ahearn, 2001). The 
identification of genuine action, therefore, also consists in a “work of purification” – a term 
dear to French sociologist Bruno Latour – in order to isolate a true, intentional and human 
action, from what would merely be its context, setting, pre-conditions or unforeseen 
consequences. 
An alternate view of action takes the form of pragmatism, which focuses on the 
effects of actions rather than on its initiation. With pragmatism, the issue of intentionality 
takes but a secondary role, as an action may have various consequences independently of 
whether they were intended or not. The pragmatist view also allow recognizing expanding 
4 
 
agency to non-humans, as objects, structures or principles, for example, may do things that 
impact the world, irrespective of whether they “want” or not to perform those things. The 
extension of agency to non-humans has regularly been derided by authors who, 
misunderstanding the argument, believed that it necessarily implied an extension of 
intentionality. A pragmatist stance also allows not presuming of the kind of actions that are 
worthy of observation: even the most banal action may turn out to have important 
consequences. Communication scholars are mostly familiar with pragmatism under the 
guise of John L. Austin’s speech act theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning lies in 
the actual use of words, or George Herbert Mead’s interactionism. For example, Derrida, in 
suggesting that a text always escapes the intention of its author, borrows from Austin. There 
is in addition a growing interest in the field of communication for the works of C. S. Pierce, 
William James or John Dewey and, more generally, what has come to be known as American 
Pragmatism (see the excellent review in Misak, 2013).  
THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION 
Communication, in most discussions of action and agency, may play at least three 
distinct roles. First, it may concern the decision to act, i.e. it consists in more or less rational, 
ethical dialogue over the choice of a course of action, as exemplified by Jürgen Habermas 
and the communication ethics tradition (which is represented in the field of 
communication, for example, by Ronald C. Arnett and Pat Arnesson). In viewing 
communication as leading to specific sequences of action, it is understood as being 
pragmatic, i.e. it is not only concerned with describing pre-existing facts, but also as 
bringing into existing new states of the world. In particular, a communicational approach to 
the decision to act has highlighted the limits of theories that view agents as solely seeking to 
maximize benefit and the world as being “out there” and available to the analysis of agents. 
Dennis Mumby and Linda Putnam’s (2000) critique of Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded 
rationality – which views emotions as peripheral to decision-making – is an example of the 
contribution communication can make to the study of the ways decisions to act are made. 
Collective management of natural resources is another a field that has witnessed a shift 
from rational-agent models – which is the approach used, for example, by Elinor Ostrom –  
to deliberative and dialogical approaches (see e.g. Cleaver, 2007). Studies that focus on 
dialogue and rational conversation may be contrasted with the so-called practice 
approaches, whether in the tradition of Bourdieu or, for instance, in the tradition of Harold 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, whose attention focuses on action as it is being committed 
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and for which the meaning of action is not negotiated in advance but rather discovered 
through its very performance or “enaction” – a term that organizational psychologist Karl E. 
Weick uses to describe the very active dimension of sensemaking. Furthermore, if as public 
administration researcher Charles Lindblom famously remarked, action – and in particular 
collective action – ends up consisting in “muddling through,” then the conversation that 
leads to the decision to act, no matter how rational, loses much of his luster. Still in the field 
of public administration, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky also remarked, in 
discussing the many failures of public policy, that divorcing decision from implementation 
misses the many, continuous renegotiations of action that take place at all stages. 
Communication may also be viewed, in a critical perspective, either as what permits 
the obfuscation of human beings’ ability to act, or as what helps reveal this obfuscation. In 
particular, media industries may distort the dialogical practices required for collective 
decision-making at the societal level. The works of Theodor Adorno , Max Horkheimer and 
other Frankfurt School philosophers consists, in that sense, in the denunciation of the 
standardisation of communication by cultural industries, leading to a form of collapse of 
reason (for a review, see Morris, 2001). The work of Robert McChesney (1996) illustrates 
this kind of critical work in communication studies. The field of organizational 
communication, for its part, abounds in critiques of official versions of organizational 
culture, of storytelling and narratives as social control mechanisms or of discourse as a 
device for the management of selves. The role of critical perspectives is regularly 
understood as giving back to the individual human agent his or her agency, which is 
confiscated by the system, structure or ideology within which he or she acts. However, as 
Jacques Derrida discusses in opposing the views of Max Stirner to those of Karl Marx, it may 
not be clear whether it is possible to reach a core of true, unmediated and uncontaminated 
agency, once all the “supplements” of agency are removed. In other words – as we will 
discuss below – it is possible that human beings may only act at the condition of being 
entangled in societies, organizations, networks and other collectives that both constrain and 
enable their agency. This argument may be likened to Canadian scholar Marshall McLuhan’s 
discussion of technology both as extending a human being’s senses and, at the same time, as 
amputating the body’s organs for those senses: the very things that allow us to act also 
prevent us from doing so at other times. 
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Another role communication may play is more technical, but is equally crucial: it 
consists in the descriptions that are made of action. As the famous anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz points out, the difference between the blinking of an eye and a complicit wink lies 
not so much in the intrinsic properties of the deed, but also in the culturally-mediated 
descriptions that may be made of it. Some descriptions (winking rather than blinking) 
invest the action with intentionality. The American literary theorist Kenneth Burke, among 
others, theorized the way action is described and attributed motives following five aspects: 
act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. Descriptions also delimit the action under scrutiny 
within a sequence of events, such as G. E. M. Anscombe’s classical example of the flicking of 
a light switch, which causes the room to be illuminated, and a robber to be scared off (as 
discussed in Wilson & Shpall, 2012). This is not only a matter of “punctuation” – as British 
philosopher Gregory Bateson would call it – and of deciding the causal order of the events: 
it is also a matter of attributing or denying authorship to various individuals and things that 
are at play. Cooren (2004), for example, in discussing the case of a note, remarks that while 
it may be said that a person reminds herself of something with a note, it is equally accurate 
to describe the situation as the note reminding her that she need to do something. In the 
first case, the agency of the person is prioritized, while in the second it is that of the note. 
Communication as a description of actions, then, plays an important part in distributing 
agency among the many people and things that make a difference in any given event (Castor 
& Cooren, 2006). 
ALTERNATE DESCRIPTIONS OF ACTION 
This last role of communication – describing action – casts intentionality and the 
search for “genuine” action in a new light. Indeed, whether or not an action is intentional 
and whether or not it is genuine become empirical matters, that may be observed through 
the way people, in conversation, account for the actions that take place. While the 
philosopher may also make descriptions of action – this is particularly the fact in the 
analytical tradition where propositions serve to analyse action – they must be 
acknowledged as existing concurrently to many other possible descriptions. 
Alternate ways of describing action are not merely different and interchangeable 
versions of a same story. The crucial character of accounting practices – a central concept in 
ethnomethodology – is better understood when communication is recognized, in a 
pragmatic light, as doing things. This is true of speech acts such as declarations or 
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commands, as John Austin or John Searle remarked, but more profoundly, as is stressed by 
French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, or by famous queer theory proponent Judith 
Butler, language constitutes our identities and the social order that binds us. For example, 
Vincent Descombes (1991, p. 35), commenting on French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic of action and his concept of narrative identity, suggests that the self is 
constituted as one narratively performs a “distinction between actions that I recognize as 
mine and those that I disavow…” and  a “distribution on either side of the border that 
separates the self and the foreign all human matters: deeds and accomplishments, feelings, 
trials, titles to honor and to shame, rights, claims, duties, merit, etc.” Communication and 
descriptions of action, in this sense, do not only refer to action, but constitute it, distribute or 
deny agency, and bind together events into broader, sensible units of action. It is also 
through communication that conceptions of agency are negotiated and shared, and become 
features of given cultures (Ahearn, 1999). 
INDIVIDUATION OF ACTION 
Viewed this way, communication may be said to be crucial to what Wilson and 
Shpall (2012) call the “individuation of action.” The notion of individuation became popular 
thanks to the mid-20th century writings of French philosopher Gilbert Simondon, who had 
an important influence, including on Gilles Deleuze. Instead of seeing action as a deed that 
happens and that is, then, described, it may be more profitable to understand action as 
something that needs to be continually brought into existence. This is true, firstly, because 
committing a deed is an effort that requires the combined sweat of many different entities, 
rather than merely the will of a conscious human. This is suggested, among others, by Bruno 
Latour and Michel Callon’s Actor-Network theory, which also draws on Simondon. The 
philosophical hesitation over the very definition of action is a testimony to the convoluted 
character of any action. Secondly, the continuous individuation of action may be connected 
to the fact that identification of a single action, with an author, a cause, a sequence of deeds, 
consequences, and so forth, is matter of debate and decision (Castor & Cooren, 2006). Any 
attempt to distribute blame or praise is a decision over the authorship of action. Agency, 
then, is not the privilege of individual people, but always concerns configurations of people, 
things, events, etc., that rely on communication. 
In addition to the roles that are listed above, communication also contributes to the 
individuation process, in two analytically distinct but empirically related ways. The first is 
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that it is through communication that entities join forces and coalesce in the 
accomplishment of an action. Callon (1986) suggests that this joint action is accomplished 
through four steps: problematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilization. In other 
words, for any action to happen, a problem must be defined in such a way that different 
entities become involved in roles that can be successfully combined, and that the linkages 
that are so created can be spoken of through a single voice. Latour (1996, p. 237) 
summarizes the joint character of any action in the formula: “To do is to make happen. 
When one acts, others proceed to action.” Communication makes possible the work of 
alignment and translation necessary for this to be possible. 
The second, related way in which communication partakes in the individuation 
process is in contributing to the after-the-fact revision of the linkages that are so 
established. Indeed, any assemblage is but provisional: a problem can be redefined, 
participants may lose interest and get disbanded, and spokespeople can be contradicted and 
repudiated. The individuation process is continuous and groupings must be performed 
again and again, for any unitary action to be describable and, indeed, possible. This means 
that action is always remains controversial, even after its initiation. In particular, for an 
action to have social import, it must be carried around, through time and space (see e.g. 
Vasquez, 2013). This is crucial for collectives to exist, according to Giddens (1984, p. 17): 
Structure thus refers, in social analysis, to the structuring properties allowing the 
“binding” of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for 
discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space 
and which lend them “systemic” form. 
This means that actions that were performed there and then must somehow be made 
pragmatically relevant here and there for them to keep existing as actions. For instance, 
while the judge’s declaration that “you are now husband and wife” is what turns a couple 
into a married couple, the continued effect of the declaration on this marriage rests on a 
network of legal documents, photos and videos from the wedding day, rings, and memories. 
It is thanks to that network that the couple is married not only as long as the judge is 
nearby, but also years later and far from the courthouse where the wedding took place. This 
means that the various elements that hold the marriage together must regularly be 
mobilized and brought together to re-present, here and now, the fact that there and then, 
the judge declared that they were married. This constantly renewed discursive performance 
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may also fail. What seemed like an obvious linkage between elements may appear harder to 
achieve, either because a document is missing, because memories are fading, or because the 
couple does not feel the same interest in reminding that they were and still are married.  
THE SHARED CHARACTER OF ACTION  
Considering that action is a collective achievement also allows revisiting the 
micro/macro or agent/structure divide. It becomes possible to say that it is both the agent 
and the structure (whatever that may be) that are active in any given situation. Prioritizing 
either element is a matter of description rather than an intrinsic feature of agency. The issue 
becomes empirical: how do people distribute agency between human participants and 
structural elements? Among others, in the field of communication, François Cooren tackles 
this question by suggesting to think of agency through the lens of ventriloquism: by viewed 
activity and passivity as effects, Cooren shows that participants present themselves as 
moved by principles, rules, organizations, attitudes, values and other elements, to which, in 
turn, they provide a voice and the ability to act in the current situation. It is exactly because 
the “real” source of action is an undecidable matter that action is possible at all. 
 Cooren calls the entities that participants invoke in their talk figures. The word, in 
addition to fitting with the metaphor of ventriloquism, avoids the loaded history of the 
other words he could have chosen, such as passions or reasons. Interestingly, Grünbaum 
(2010, p. 337) considers that “an intentional action is an action an agent is performing 
because she has some reason to do so.” For Cooren, it could very well be said that when 
someone is acting for a reason, then it is the action that is acting through him and her and 
that, therefore, it is not the truly – or at least not only – the person who is acting. This is also 
what Derrida, on whom Cooren draws, stresses when discussing friendship or duty: one 
cannot claim to love for some reason, for then he does not love the friend, but rather the 
reason; one cannot admit acting out of duty, because then he would not be acting dutifully. 
Derrida suggests that this is where secrecy plays a part: it is only by not disclosing the 
reasons of action that agency can be reclaimed. Arguably, however, in most cases there is no 
problem for anyone in recognizing that agency is shared and that when one act on behalf of 
some figure, one is also acting by oneself. 
 The shared character of action has been studied through the narratology of 
Lithuanian-born French semiotician A. J. Greimas. His approach is not limited to the study of 
narratives as such, but allows studying action narratively. For example, Daniel Robichaud 
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(2003) looks at the ways stories told at a city hall meeting are imbricated into each other to 
constitute collective action. Narratology, thus, constists in the study of the way 
communicative and, specifically, discursive performances weave together singular events 
into sensible units of action, complete with a subject, an object, and an effort from the first 
to recover the second. Greimas’ model is of particular importance because it recognizes that 
action is a case of “participative communication,” meaning that when one shares one’s 
action with another, one does not lose it for that much. For instance, when someone claims 
to be acting on behalf of someone else, it does not mean for that much that the first person 
has not also accomplished the deed: action can have multiple authors at once, who can 
circulate it among them without any one of them losing authorship for that much 
(Bencherki & Cooren, 2011). 
THE ACTION OF COLLECTIVES  
The fact that authorship of action can be shared between several authors at once is 
crucial in extending the notion of action to collectives and organizations and, more 
generally, in allowing a discussion on agency. Communication, here again, plays a crucial 
role. A first way of understanding the action of collectives is in considering it as a 
coordination of the actions of the human individuals who populate the said collective. This 
may be paralleled, for instance, with Weber’s notion of “social behavior,” which he defines 
as “related by the individuals involved to the conduct of others and is oriented accordingly” 
(Weber, 1969, p. 29). The role of communication, in this first variant of collective action, is 
to ensure that a collection of individuals work together to reach a goal that brings them 
together. Another way of understanding collective action is to ask whether the collective 
itself may be an actor in its own right and at its own level, without reducing it to the action 
of the individuals that populate it. For instance, King, Felin and Whetten (2010) propose 
different views of the way an organization may be considered as a social actor. A common 
opposition to the view that organizations are actors in their own right is to consider this as 
a fiction – in particular in a critical perspective that would decry the stories and other 
discursive devices by which people are usurped their agency – or an “attribution error” (as 
some psychologists would call it), i.e. people mistakenly believe that social entities are 
acting and fail to identify the actual human actors. For social psychologist Karl Weick, this is 
an ontological oscillation that is of little use when accounting for action, as it may be at once 
true that people act on behalf of their organization and that the organization is acting. For 
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communication scholars, the fascinating question is not whether either position is truer 
than the other, but rather how the passage from one to the other is achieved. 
 One perspective that offers to show how people may act on behalf of organizations 
is the principal-agent model, which is at the basis of what has been called firm theory. In 
this model, a principal – the organization, its managers or shareholders – delegates a certain 
number of actions to an agent who acts in its behalf. The problem, for firm theory, is to 
ensure that the delegated task gets performed according to the principal’s expectations. 
Solutions include, among others, a more or less enforceable contract or the provision of 
incentives. Communication, in a principal-agent model, is one of the ways by which a 
principal may clarify its expectations to the agent and, conversely, a means for the agent to 
report its activities back to the principal. Some writing has also been devoted to the initial 
negotiation of the contract, prior to the agent’s engagement. The principal-agent approach 
is criticized, among other, by communication scholar Timothy Kuhn. 
The principal-agent model is criticized for putting too much emphasis on the 
contractual relation and for presuming the very organizational action that it claims to 
elucidate. In other words, it does not take into account the actual communication practices 
that constitute the relation between the organization and the humans who act on its behalf, 
and that allow the organization to act. An alternative is provided by an approach to 
organizational communication called Communicative Constitution of Communication (see 
Putnam & Nicotera, 2009), or CCO, which accents the contribution of communication to the 
very make-up and endurance of collectives. In the CCO tradition, and in particular in the 
work of François Cooren, organizations may act because they are presentified, i.e. invoked or 
mobilized, in the current context, where they can then make a difference. Communication is 
then the means through which this summoned and made to act in the situation. The 
question of authority or authorship is crucial in understanding this relation. As prominent 
organizational communication scholar James R. Taylor explains, people invoke the 
organization as acting with them – i.e. they share actions with it – because it lends them 
authority and, indeed, allows them to act and be author of their own actions. It therefore in 
and through communication that organizations can act.  
If it is recognized that organizations may act at their own level, including to enable 
the action of people, then the question of intentionality loses its value. Communication 
scholars concerned with collective action are more interested in providing useful accounts 
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of that action and of the way it is concretely performed, than with identifying some 
“genuine” action. Whether intention is involved or not, or whether people distinguish 
between different types of action, are then empirical matters instead of philosophical pre-
definitions of the concept of action. In that sense, the study of collective action is mainly 
pragmatic. 
THE REALITY OF ACTION 
Discussing of the intersection between communication and action raises an 
important question: that of the reality of the action being scrutinized. If, for example, we 
suppose that action is subject to several alternate definitions, then one possible accusation 
is that we fall prey to a form of relativism where possibly wrong descriptions of action are 
put on the same footing as the actual action. Not only could those descriptions be 
unfortunate mistakes, but an additional risk is that they may serve to further political 
agendas and serve to deceive people on their agency, giving them an illusory impression of 
freedom. For example, when suggesting that communication constitutes organizations, then 
perhaps researchers are also misleading people into thinking that they have some influence 
on the structures where they work. Another danger of communicational perspectives on 
action would be to provide the false impression that discussing action amounts in itself to 
an independence from the real, material constraints that limit people’s agency. In other 
words, instead of actually freeing people from their chains, we are merely finding nicer 
names for them. 
This debate could be said to be a symptom of a more conventional one: the debate 
over the reality of language. When, for example, Gilles Deleuze, in his interview with Claire 
Parnet, vehemently criticizes Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it is because the French 
philosopher has in mind an acute separation between reality and language. In focusing on 
language, Wittgensteinians would have lost sight of reality itself – or corporeality – and 
merely attended to its descriptions, taking the sign for the thing. Deleuze probably has in 
mind the early Wittgenstein and, more generally, analytical philosophy – say, Gottlob Frege 
or Bertrand Russel. This trend of philosophy could be broadly (and somewhat unfairly) 
described, for our purpose, as believing that the meaning of propositions (i.e. descriptions 
of the world) could be logically discovered and that it would teach us something about the 
world as such. A proposition such as “the cat is on the mat” could be broken down and 
analysed, until something could be learned about the possibility of some cat finding itself on 
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some mat. Wittgenstein, however, changed his tune and suggested in his later work 
(including his Philosophical Investigations) a completely revised version of his philosophy. 
Rather than supposing that language reflects reality, he proposed that language takes on its 
meaning through the way it is used in actual contexts. Another way of saying this is that 
words mean what they do. “The cat is on the mat” may be used as an example, in which case 
it does not actually refer to any cat sitting on any mat: instead, it calls the reader to imagine 
some typical proposition used in analytical philosophy; it means “any banal sentence that 
philosophers use.” It is its use (in this paper) that provides it with meaning, and not some 
relation to existing outside situations, with which it would have been mistaken. 
The sentence, then, is not some kind of layer of description added on top of a 
substrate of reality. The sentence does something in its own right (it provides the reader 
with an example). As American pragmatist William James put it, “any idea upon which we 
can ride” has an element of reality. Language, inasmuch as it does things and has effects, 
therefore, is part of reality, rather than being opposed to it. More importantly, the effects of 
language occupy a level of reality that is not of a different order than other kinds of effects. 
Once again, Deleuze and Guattari, in “Postulates of Linguistics,” a chapter from A Thousand 
Plateaus, distinguish between actual “corporeal” effects and linguistic “incorporeal” ones. 
The authors give the example of a judge declaring a convict guilty. They oppose the reality 
of the subsequent imprisonment with the incorporeal effect of the alleged “guilt” of the 
culprit. This, of course, corresponds to a specific way of delimiting the action of the 
(linguistic) verdict: Austin’s speech act theory could very be used to argue that the 
perlocutory action of the verdict is the imprisonment, and that, therefore, the words of the 
judge have very concrete and bodily effects. 
Communication’s ability to link together different aspects of reality – such as a body 
and a jail, or different components of organizations – is therefore not only a fiction, i.e. a 
truth that would only be valid within a linguistic realm that would be distinct from “the real 
world.” We could even go as far as to suggest that fictional characters, such as the Jack the 
Ripper or Mickey Mouse, in different ways, have effects beyond the pages of their respective 
stories. If what defines reality is the effect or the contribution to the world, then Jack the 
Ripper, by having kept many young people awake well past their bedtime, has acted in a 
way at least as real as caffeine may act on bodies. While a discussion on Jack the Ripper may 
seem trivial, the importance of recognizing the reality of communication’s contribution to 
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action becomes all the more sensitive when we think of whether BP is “responsible” for the 
2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, or whether the European Union is responding 
appropriately to Russia’s incorporation of Crimea. Indeed, in those cases, it would very well 
be possible to claim that BP, the European Union, Russia or Crimea are merely fictitious 
beings and that our accounts of those actions fall in the trap of reifying them. What matters, 
after all, is the reality of the flesh-and-blood people being affected by those situations. 
However, common sense and literature alike are willing to recognize that organizational or 
systematic constraints and configurations have real consequences; that it is not necessarily 
any single individual at BP, but the way the organization is structured, or “the spirit of 
capitalism” that led to the oil spill. Similarly, while some people would like to blame specific 
Russian officials for the annexing of Crimea, or specific European leaders for their inaction, 
it could also be said that there are very real historical, economic and social configurations 
that make this situation possible.  If people are being affected by these situations, then it is 
also an acknowledgement that the “situation” does things that are real enough to affect 
them. The ability of those situations to act relies on communication. 
Communication scholars, in recognizing that nations, principles, fictions and other 
seeming immaterial entities may be really active in given situations, provide a powerful tool 
for the study of the ways in which human action is shared – for better or for worse – with 
elements that may constrain or enable it. Swedish authors Mats Alvesson and Dan 
Kärreman point out that it is possible to distinguish between two trends in the study of the 
relationship between language and the constraints on agency: “big D” Discourse and “small 
d” discourse. One “big D” side, Foucault’s insistence on the way power lies in a network of 
related discourses that constitute the knowledge of what is appropriate and speakable at 
this point in time, is one theory from which communication scholars draw to illustrate the 
role language plays in the limitation of agency. Many critical scholars, for example in 
studying gender issues in the workplace, attempt to reconstruct the web of discourses that 
provide a specific role at work to women or other minority people and that pass as natural 
and commonsensical knowledge. On the small d side, scholars who study interactions, 
either from the perspective of symbolic interactionism, with the works of Erving Goffman or 
Geroge Herbert Mead in mind, or that of Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, are 
concerned with the way language contributes to the emergence of a social order that 
becomes binding for the people involved. One oft-cited example is D. Lawrence Wieder’s 
study of the “convict code,” where the author shows how inmates at a transition house 
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discursively create and maintain a set of rules that is distinct from the house’s “official” 
ones. While they are active in interactionally elaborating them, they also feel really bound 
by them – it is not because something is created that it is any less real. Communication 
scholars also have a unique potential to bridge the gap between small d and big D, or micro 
and macro – or, in fact, they can help show that the gap is regularly ignored in the way 
people actually talk and behave. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz provides valuable 
examples of the way something as “macro” as culture is made up of a web of shared 
meanings and that ethnography provides a look into the concrete actions through which 
people constitute and maintain those meanings. Communication, then, is also the way that 
we create the structures in which we sometimes feel trapped – but also allows us to escape 
from them. 
SEE ALSO 
Actor-Network Theory; Structure; Cause and Effect; Culture; Performance; 
Pragmatism; Speech acts 
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